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NOTES 
Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of 
the Bankruptcy Code 
When a party commences a bankruptcy action, 1 a bankruptcy es-
tate is created which will later be distributed to the bankrupt's credi-
tors. 2 This estate generally3 includes "all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."4 A 
debtor is permitted to retain only property that is either "excluded" or 
1. The exclusions and exemptions discussed in this Note, which are provided for in chapter S 
of the Bankruptcy Code, are available regardless of whether the debtor is filing under chapter 7 
(liquidation), chapter 11 (reorganization) or chapter 13 (adjustment of debts of an individual 
with regular income) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 2 CoLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL~ 103.02 
(L. King 3d ed. 1979). Because pension benefits accrue to individuals, the issue discussed in this 
Note will normally arise only under a chapter 7 or 13 bankruptcy. Usually the issue arises in the 
context of a chapter 7 bankruptcy, in which the property of the debtor is collected, liquidated, 
and distributed to her creditors, and the debtor's debts are discharged. 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (1982) provides: 
(a) the commencement of a case under under [sic] section 301, 302, or 303 of this title 
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. 
3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (1982) accommodates two exceptions, provided for in§ 541(b) and 
§ 541(c)(2). The § 541(c)(2) exception is discussed fully below. See notes 8-15 infra and accom· 
panying text. Section 541(b) excludes from property of the estate "any power that the debtor 
may only exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor'' and is not relevant to 
the issue presented in this Note. 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (1982). Nonbankruptcy law defines an "interest in property," 
whereas bankruptcy law determines whether or not that interest passes into the bankruptcy es-
tate. Jn re Ross, 18 Bankr. 364, 367 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Missouri, 7 Bankr. 974, 980 (E.D. 
Ark. 1980); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), 
ajfd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
Congress intended that the bankruptcy estate be as all-encompassing as the language indi-
cates. The legislative history of§ 54l(a)(l) states: 
The scope of this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or 
intangible property, causes of action . • • and all other forms of property currently specified 
in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act • . . . [I]t includes as property of the estate all prop-
erty of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. 
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 823, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
5787, 5868 [hereinafter cited as S: REP. No. 989, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS]; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6323-24 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595, reprinted in 1918 
U.S. CooE CoNG. & AD. NEWS]; see Missouri ex rel Runyan v. United States Bankruptcy 
Court, 647 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); In re Ross, 18 
Bankr. at 367; Graham, 24 Bankr. at 309; Harry Brainum, Jr., Inc. v. Shore Air Conditioning & 
Refrigeration (In re Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration), 18 Bankr. 643, 646 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1982); In re Koch, 14 Bankr. 64, 65 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
The current Bankruptcy Code gives a more uniform and comprehensive scope to the term 
"property of the estate" than did the old Bankruptcy Code. See S. REP. No. 989 at 82, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CooE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 5868, supra,· H.R. REP. No. 595 at 175-76, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 6136-37, supra,· Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas 
Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson, 41 Bankr. 893, 896 (D.S.C. 1984). Although 
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"exempted" from the estate. 5 A qualified pension and profit sharing 
fund created under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA)6 constitutes an "interest in property" and will be distributed 
to creditors unless either excluded or exempted.7 Section 54l(c)(2) of 
the Bankruptcy Code8 excludes a narrow class of property.9 It pro-
vides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the 
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law is enforceable in a case under this title." 10 The legislative history 
under the old Bankruptcy Act exempt property never entered the bankruptcy estate, under the 
current Act it is initially included, subject to subsequent exemption. 41 Bankr. at 896. 
Section 70(a)(5) of the old Bankruptcy Act provided: 
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall . . . be vested by operation of law 
with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition [to] ... (5) property, 
including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means 
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process 
against him, or otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l) (1982)). The policies of 
the old Bankruptcy Act were to secure for the benefit of creditors everything of value that the 
bankrupt possessed in alienable or leviable form, and to allow the bankrupt an unencumbered 
fresh start. Goffv. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 1983). Under the old Act the courts in 
each case examined the legal nature of the asset in light of the conflicting purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to determine whether or not the asset would be included in the estate. 706 F.2d at 
578. The Supreme Court developed the rule that when property was "sufficiently rooted in the 
prebankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered 
fresh start" it should be property of the estate. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). 
Under the current Bankruptcy Code most pension plan funds, of any type, are included in the 
estate. Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); see, e.g., In 
re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (IRAs), supplemented by, 23 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1982). However, under the old Code, pension plan funds were generally not property 
of the estate because they were understood to be a substitute for future wages. Hinshaw, 23 
Bankr. at 234; see Turpin v. Wente, 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981); Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Judson v. Witlin, 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(Keogh plan); In re Mace, 4 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978) (IRA plan); In re 
Wilson, 3 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 844 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1977) (stock savings plan). 
5. Exempted property initially enters the estate and is subsequently removed, whereas ex-
cluded property never enters the estate. See Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.id 574, 579 (5th Cir. 1983). 
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-144 and at scattered sections of the I.R.C.). 
7. Several courts have directly addressed the issue of whether qualified ERISA plans are 
excluded or become property of the bankruptcy estate. See Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 
(8th Cir. 1984); Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. 
Kan.), revd., 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); In re Watson, 13 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1981). Other courts have simply accepted the proposition that such plans are property of the 
estate and have focused instead on the issue of whether or not such plans may be exempted (as 
opposed to excluded) from the estate. See In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); 
Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Kochell, 26 
Bankr. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), affd., 31Bankr.139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), ajfd., 732 F.2d 564 
(7th Cir. 1984); see also In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Barik.r. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (pension plan 
qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 401); Joelson v. Tiffin Sav. Bank (In re Everhart), 11 Bankr. 770 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (same). 
8. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982). 
9. This exclusion is expressly accommodated in§ 541(a)(l), see note 2supra, and§ 541(c)(l), 
see note 10 infra. 
10. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982). Generally, a restriction on the transfer of the debtor's in-
terest in property will not prevent the inclusion of such a property interest in the estate. 11 
U.S.C. § 541(c)(l) (1982) provides: 
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assumes that this section applies only to spendthrift trusts.1 1 Most 
courts that have considered the question have concluded that BRISA 
pension plans are property of the estate. 12 Some courts have con-
cluded that section 541(c)(2) was not intended to exclude BRISA ben-
efits, and that they never constitute traditional spendthrift trusts of the 
sort Congress intended to exclude.13 Other courts have examined the 
(c)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the debtor in 
property becomes property of the estate under subsection (a)(l), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of this 
section notwithstanding any provision -
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor • • • • 
The legislative history explains the above provision: 
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of the debtor, in order 
that all of the interests of the debtor in property will become property of the estate. The 
provisions invalidated are those that restrict or condition transfer of the debtor's interest 
S. REP. No. 989 at 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 5869, supra note 4. 
To the extent they conflict, the Bankruptcy Code takes precedence over ERISA, which, 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (1982), requires that each plan state that benefits provided under 
the plan may not be assigned or alienated. ERISA explicitly states that "[n]othing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supercede any law of the 
United States." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982); see Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 
305, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), ajfd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
Most courts agree that the statutorily mandated restrictions on alienation and assignment in 
ERISA plans, see notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text, do not prevent them from becoming 
property of the estate. See In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786, 787 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); Firestone 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); 
Graham, 24 Bankr. at 309; see also Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1982) (state 
statute prohibiting alienation and assignment of state pension benefits does not prevent them 
from becoming property of the estate, nor does qualification under 26 U.S.C. § 401); In re Wood, 
23 Bankr. 552, 560 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (restrictions do not prevent benefits from being 
paid over to a chapter 13 trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1323(b)). But see note 15 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
11. A classic spendthrift trust is a trust "intended to secure the trust fund against the im-
providence of the cestui que trust (beneficiary) by protecting it against his creditors and render-
ing it inalienable by him before payment ..•• " 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 26 (1955). 
H.R. REP. No. 595 at 176, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6136, supra 
note 4, compares the then proposed Code (the current Code) with the old Act: 
The bill also continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's interest 
in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applicable 
State law. The bankruptcy of the beneficiary should not be permitted to defeat the legiti-
mate expectations of the settler of the trust. 
(footnote omitted). The Senate Report also explains that§ 541(c)(2) "preserves restrictions on n 
transfer of a spendthrift trust ••. enforceable [under] nonbankruptcy law." S. REP. No. 989 at 
83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE cONG. & Ao. NEWS at 5869, supra note 4. The Senate version, 
which was ultimately rejected in favor of the House version, limited the exclusion to the extent 
"reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his dependents." Id. 
12. Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984). 
13. See Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1271-73 (8th Cir. 1984); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 
81, 84-86 (2d Cir. 1982); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. 
Stephenson, 41 Bankr. 893, 896-98 (D. S.C. 1984); In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786, 787-88 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1983); In re Strasma, 26 Bankr. 449, 450 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (relying on 
Threewitt); Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 438-39 (Bnnkr. 
D. Kan.) (also relying on fact that ERISA plan would not constitute a traditional spendthrift 
trust under state law), revd., 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982). 
First, these courts argued that the legislative history of§ 541(c)(2) is "limited in its applica-
tion to true spendthrift trusts, as distinguished from ERISA-type trusts." In re Kelley, 31 
Bankr. 786, 788 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983). ERISA provides that its provisions do not affect the 
operation of other federal statutes, thus ERISA-required anti-alienation clauses do not prevent 
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particular BRISA plan before them to determine whether or not it 
constitutes a spendthrift trust under state law and thus is excludable.14 
Another set of courts, however, have held that section 541(c)(2) pro-
vides a broader exclusion that allows a court to exclude BRISA funds 
from the estate regardless of whether or not they constitute spendthrift 
trusts. 15 The issue of whether or not BRISA funds may be excluded 
the inclusion of pension benefits in a debtor's bankruptcy estate. Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d at 
1273. Second, these courts argue that "a construction of Section 54l(c)(2) which excludes a 
debtor's interest in an BRISA-type trust from property of the estate would render the federal 
exemption contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(lO)(E)(ili) meaningless." In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786, 
788 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); see Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272; Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 
at 86. 
Furthermore, BRISA permits various transactions that would not be permitted under a clas-
sic spendthrift trust. Central States, S.B. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. Ste-
phenson, 41 Bankr. 893, 897-98 (D.S.C. 1984). First, ERISA allows a beneficiary to assign 
voluntarily up to 10% of any benefit payment. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1982). Second, a benefi-
ciary may encumber her interest in an BRISA plan by offering it as security for a loan. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1056(d)(2) (1982). Third, BRISA allows for the complete alienation of benefits if such aliena-
tion is revocable at any time by the participant or beneficiary and the third party files a written 
acknowledgment with the plan administrator stating that she "has no enforceable right in, or to, 
any plan benefit payment or portion thereof." 26 C.F.R. § l.401(a)-13(e) (1984). Fourth, a re-
tired employee may authorize a trustee to deduct and pay union dues from an BRISA plan. 
Central States, S.B. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson, 41 Bankr. 893, 
897 (D.S.C. 1984) (citing Rev. Rul. 68-159, 1968-1 C.B. 153). 
14. See Goffv. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 586 (5th Cir. 1983) ("While pensions might be excluda-
ble from the property of the estate pursuant to section 54l(c)(2), the state law exemption, their 
exclusion under that section is provided solely by state spendthrift trust law and not by the 
operation of ERISA.") (footnote omitted); In re LaFata, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 70,020, at 
85,773 (Bankr. B.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 1984); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di 
Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 918-22 (Bankr. N.D. ID. 1983); Samore v. Graham (Jn re Graham), 24 
Bankr. 305, 310-11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), affd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Avery Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. K!ayer (Jn re K!ayer), 20 Bankr. 270, 272-74 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981). In 
all of the above cases, however, the court found that there was no valid spendthrift trust under 
state law. See also Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543, 546 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1983) (noting in dicta that under Ohio law BRISA plans might be considered spendthrift 
trusts); In re Wood, 23 Bankr. 552, 555 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (chapter 13 case noting in 
dicta that the court "finds persuasive and accepts the Plan's argument [in the context of a chap-
ter 7 case] that ERISA's anti-alienation language calls for treating a qualified plan like a spend-
thrift trust under state law"). 
State law is the proper law under which to determine whether or not a particular plan creates 
a spendthrift trust. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 310 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 1982), affd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); see In re Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 830 (Bankr. 
B.D. Tenn. 1982). 
15. See Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); Warren v. G.M. 
Scott & Sons (Jn re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543, 544-46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 
Bankr. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982). The 
court in Clotfelter held that§ 54l(c)(2) excludes from the bankrupt's estate all trusts that bar 
creditors from reaching a beneficiary's interest, and thus the court excluded ERISA funds. The 
court presented three arguments. First, 
Since Congress did not choose to use the term "spendthrift trust" in the language of the 
section itself, there is no reason to suppose that when the term appears in the legislative 
history it should be taken as a term of art; it is more reasonable to suppose that the term 
should be given its ordinary, more general meaning as "inclusive of all trusts which bar 
creditors from reaching a beneficiary's interest •... " 
24 Bankr. at 929 (quoting 76 AM. JuR. 2o Trusts§ 148 (1975)). Second, under nonbankruptcy 
law a debtor's interest in an BRISA plan is beyond the reach of creditors. 24 Bankr. at 929. 
Finally, the§ 522(d)(lO)(E) exemption for BRISA plans, see note 108 infra, merely overlaps with 
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from the estate under section 541(c)(2) is beyond the scope of this 
Note, which focuses instead on whether or not BRISA funds may be 
exempted from the estate under section 522(b )(2)(A), assuming argu-
endo that they cannot be excluded. If BRISA funds are excluded from 
the bankruptcy estate, then the issue of whether or not BRISA funds 
may be exempted from the estate is never reached. 
The Bankruptcy Act provides for two exemption schemes, a fed-
eral scheme and a state scheme, and generally allows a debtor in any 
given case to choose between the two. 16 If the federal scheme is 
elected, one of the federal bankruptcy exemptions allows a debtor to 
exempt her BRISA funds "to the extent reasonably necessary for the 
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor," unless certain 
other conditions are not met.17 Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Act al-
lows a state to "opt out" of the federal bankruptcy exemption 
scheme, 18 and in states that exercise that option, 19 a debtor may not 
§ 541(c)(2) and its existence does not indicate that§ 541(c)(2) cannot operate to exclude ERISA 
funds from the estate. 24 Bankr. at 929-30. For a criticism of the reasoning in Clotfelter, see 
Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1983). The court in Phillips also argued that its holding was supported by public policy, which 
was to ensure that beneficiaries of retirement plans reap the ultimate benefits upon retirement. 34 
Bankr. at 545-46. 
16. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982) provides: 
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from 
property of the estate either -
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law 
that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does 
not so authorize; or, in the alternative, 
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this 
section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition • • • • 
The rational debtor obviously will elect the system that will permit her to retain a larger share of 
her assets. This will depend upon the type of property held by the debtor and the state exemp-
tions available to her. Should the debtor make an improvident election, she may petition to 
change her election, or the court on its own motion, in the interest of justice, may change her 
election. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595 at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 6316, supra note 4. 
17. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982); see note 112 infra. Thus the issue addressed in this 
Note will arise only when the ERISA funds are not excluded from the estate under§ 541(c)(2), 
and the debtor has elected (or the state has elected for her by opting out of the federal exemp-
tions) the state exemptions. 
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(l) (1982), which allows the debtor to elect to exempt property 
specified under § 522(d) "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph 
(2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize." 
19. Thirty-four states have opted out of the federal exemptions pursuant to the provisions of 
11 u.s.c. § 522(b)(l) (1982). See ALA. CooE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-210 (Supp. 1983); CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE 
§ 703.130(a) (Deering 1983); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 13-54-107 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 4914 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 222.20 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN.§ 51-
1601 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CoDE § 11-609 (Supp. 1984); IND. CooE ANN. § 34-2-28-0.5 (West 
1983); IOWA CooE ANN.§ 627.10 (West Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-2312 (1983); 
KY. REV. STAT.§ 427.170 (Supp. 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13:3881(B) (West Supp. 1984); 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4426 (Supp. 1984-85); Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 11-504(g) (1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.427 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 
(1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-15, 105 (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090(3) (1981); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a (1983); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284 (McKinney Supp. 1984); 
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elect federal exemptions, but instead must rely on the state exemption 
scheme. If a debtor elects the state exemption scheme, or state law 
precludes her from electing the federal scheme, section 522(b )(2)(A) 
entitles her to exempt any property that is exempt under state law and 
"any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection 
(d) of this section."20 Whereas subsection (d) of section 522 cata-
logues the federal bankruptcy exemptions, subsection (b)(2)(A) identi-
fies the "federal nonbankruptcy exemptions," which are so called 
because they are grounded on federal law other than the Bankruptcy 
Code.21 
Thus the BRISA funds of a debtor who elects the state exemption 
scheme, or whom state law prevents from electing the federal scheme, 
might be exempted in two ways. First, the applicable state law may 
afford an exemption. 22 Second, section 522(b )(2)(A) may exempt 
them if an appropriate federal nonbankruptcy statute that exempts 
BRISA funds exists. The legislative history of section 522(b )(2)(A) 
lists some of the statutes that Congress considered to be exempting 
nonbankruptcy statutes, but BRISA is not among them.23 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1C-1601(f) (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-22-17 (Supp. 1981); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(16) (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § l(B) (1981); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 23.305 (1981); s.c. CoDE ANN. § 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 43-31-30-43-45-13 (1983); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980); UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 78-23-15 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE§ 34-3.1 (1984); W. VA. CoDE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1984); 
WYO. STAT. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1984). 
In addition, Minnesota enacted a statute that prevents a debtor from claiming any of the 
federal bankruptcy exemptions of§ 522(d) for a period of three years from the date of the filing 
of an individual bankruptcy petition by the debtor's spouse if the spouse claimed any exemption 
pursuant to Minnesota law. MINN. STAT. § 550.371 (1982). 
The opt-out provision itself has been the subject of heated legal controversy. The provision 
has been challenged as delegating too much power to the states and as creating an exemption 
scheme too nonuniform to be constitutional. Another issue raised by the provision is whether or 
not the exemptions of a given state can be so at odds with federal policy as to be invalid under the 
supremacy clause. States opting out of the federal exemptions may frustrate Congress's fresh 
start policy. See, e.g., Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemptions in 
a Sorry State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1; Note, Federal Exemptions and the Opt-Out Provisions of 
Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge, 58 IND. L.J. 143 (1982). 
20. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982). 
21. See Barr v. Hinshaw (Jn re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233, 234 n.5 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) 
(emphasis added). 
22. See 7 L. KING, CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (1984). For an example of a state statute 
exempting ERISA funds under some circumstances, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2329.66(A)(10)(b) (Page 1981). 
23. The illustrative list is as follows: 
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104; 
Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407; 
Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. § 1717; 
Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. § 601; 
Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265; 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits, 
33 u.s.c. § 916; 
Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 228(L); 
Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. § 352(E); 
Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C. § 3101; 
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Two federal laws may provide the basis for the exemption of BR-
ISA funds under section 522(b)(2)(A).24 The first, an BRISA provi-
sion, requires that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits 
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.''25 The sec-
ond, a tax provision, requires that a trust, in order to qualify for tax-
exempt treatment, provide "that benefits provided under the plan may 
not be assigned or alienated."26 The Treasury Regulation interpreting 
the tax provision27 requires that a plan provide that benefits "may not 
be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or sub-
ject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equi-
table process.''28 
The courts have split on the issue of whether or not these two stat-
utes29 constitute exempting statutes under section 522(b)(2)(A). In 
Samore v. Graham, 30 the Eighth Circuit held that the two statutes are 
not exempting statutes and in Goff v. Taylor, 31 the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressed agreement. These courts found the exclusion of BRISA from 
the list of exempting statutes in the legislative history to be highly 
probative of the fact that Congress did not intend to exempt BRISA 
funds under section 522(b )(2)(A). 32 The lower court in Graham con-
cluded that the BRISA provisions, unlike the listed statutes, did not 
protect BRISA funds from involuntary assignment, and thus should 
and 
Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. § 175. 
S. REP. No. 989 at 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 5861, supra note 4; 
H.R. REP. No. 595 at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6316, supra note 
4. The reports provide no further suggestion of what other federal laws Congress intended to 
bring within§ 522(b)(2)(A). 
24. Either statute alone may provide the basis for the argument that BRISA funds are ex· 
empt under§ 522(b)(2)(A). It is irrelevant which statute is relied upon because they are substan· 
tively similar; both prohibit the assignment and alienation of BRISA benefits. See text 
accompanying notes 25-28 infra. 
25. 29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(l) (1982). 
26. 26 U.S.C. § 40l(a)(l3) (1982). 
27. This regulation also interprets § 1056(d). See note 83 infra and accompanying text. 
28. 26 C.F.R. § 1.40l(a)-13(b)(l) (1984). 
29. Throughout the Note these two statutes will be jointly referred to as the "BRISA provi-
sions" or the "BRISA statutes." 
30. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984), affg. 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982). 
31. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). The issue in Goff was whether or not§ 541(c)(2) excluded 
BRISA funds from property of the estate. The court examined§ 522(b)(2)(A) to aid its determi· 
nation of the scope of§ 54l(c)(2)'s exclusion. Concluding that § 522(b)(2)(A) did not exempt 
BRISA funds, the court argued that "Congress did not intend to do ambiguously in Section 541 
that which it clearly did not do directly in Section 522, although Section 522 explicitly addresses 
the extent to which other 'Federal law' and retirement benefit exemptions would be recognized." 
706_ F.2d at 582. 
As this Note was going to print, decisions were handed down in two new cases directly on 
point. Both relied solely upon the reasoning in Goff and Graham, and held that BRISA benefits 
were not exempted under§ 522(b)(2)(A). See Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 Bankr. 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984). 
32. See note 45 infra. 
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not be included under section 522(b )(2)(A). 33 Furthermore, both 
courts of appeals argued that the property exempted by the listed stat-
utes was peculiarly public in nature while BRISA funds were pri-
vate. 34 In opposition to Goff and Graham, the bankruptcy court for 
the District of Kansas held, in Barr v. Hinshaw, 35 that the two statutes 
are exempting statutes under section 522(b )(2)(A). This court com-
pared the BRISA statutes' prohibitions on alienation with those of the 
statutes listed in the legislative history, and found them sufficiently 
similar to conclude that Congress intended an analogous federal ex-
emption for BRISA plans. 36 
This Note argues that the two federal statutes are exempting stat-
utes under section 522(b)(2)(A), and thus BRISA funds should be ex-
empt in a bankruptcy action when the debtor uses the state exemption 
scheme. Part I argues that standard principles of statutory interpreta-
tion, as applied to the language of the bankruptcy statute, refute the 
possibility that Congress intended the list of statutes in the legislative 
history to be exclusive. Having established that statutes other than 
those listed may be included under section 522(b )(2)(A), Part II first 
refutes the argument that the absence of BRISA from the list of ex-
empting statutes implies that BRISA was not intended to be an ex-
empting statute. Part II then compares the BRISA provisions with 
the listed statutes, considering both the extent to which they protect 
property from creditors and the nature of the property they protect, 
and concludes that it is consistent with congressional intent to treat 
the two BRISA statutes as exempting statutes. Part III argues that 
the policy objectives of both BRISA and the Bankruptcy Code will be 
served only by interpreting section 522(b)(2)(A) as providing an ex-
emption for BRISA funds. 
I. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: NON-
BXCLUSIVITY OF THE LIST 
The absence of BRISA from the list of exempting statutes in the 
Bankruptcy Code's legislative history does not conclusively show that 
BRISA is not an exempting statute within the contemplation of sec-
tion 522(b )(2)(A), because the legislative history does not purport to 
offer a complete list of exempting statutes. In the Senate Report, the 
precise language preceeding the list is "[s ]ome of the items that may be 
exempted under Federal laws other than title 11 include . ... " 37 The 
33. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), affd., 
726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); see notes 58·64 infra and accompanying text. 
34. Graham, 726 F.2d at ·1274; Goff, 706 F.2d at 585-86; see notes 94-98 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
35. (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
36. 23 Bankr. at 235; see notes 67-70 infra and accompanying text. 
37. s. REP. No. 989 at 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 5861, supra 
note 4 (emphasis added). 
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House Report uses similar language. 38 In American Surety Co. v. 
Marotta, 39 the Supreme Court recognized that "[i]n definitive provi-
sions of statutes and other writings, 'include' is frequently, if not gen-
erally, used as a word of extension or enlargement rather than as one 
of limitation or enumeration."40 Courts should look to the context of 
the word to determine whether or not it is a word of extension.41 
Within the context of the phrase "some of the items ... include," the 
word "include" clearly is a word of extension rather than one of 
limitation. 
Furthermore, the statutory rules of construction for the Bank-
ruptcy Code state that" 'includes' and 'including' are not limiting."42 
The legislative history states that this rule is a codification of American 
Surety Co. v. Marotta. 43 Therefore, Congress surely had the principle 
of interpretation announced in that case in mind when it prepared the 
legislative history for the Bankruptcy Code. 
Thus it seems clear that statutes other than those listed in the legis-
lative history may be included under section 522(b )(2)(A). 44 Part II 
demonstrates that the ERISA statutes are among those that come 
within the intent of that section. 
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT: INCLUSION OF ERISA WITHIN 
SECTION 522(b )(2)(A) 
A. Exclusion of ERISA from List of Statutes in the Legislative 
History 
The Goff and Graham courts, although not arguing that the list in 
the legislative history was exclusive, did find the absence of ERISA 
from that list probative of a congressional intent that ERISA not be an 
exempting statute.45 The Goff court considered the prominence and 
38. H.R. REP. No. 595 at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6316, 
supra note 4 ("If the debtor chooses the latter, some of the items that may be exempted under 
other Federal laws include .... ") (emphasis added). 
39. 287 U.S. 513 (1933). 
40. 287 U.S. at 517. 
41. See 287 U.S. at 517. 
42. 11 u.s.c. § 102(3) (1982). 
43. s. REP. No. 989 at 28, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 5814, supra 
note 4. 
44. It should be noted that although the circuit courts in Goff and the bankruptcy and appel-
late courts in Graham found the absence of BRISA from the list probative of a congressional 
intent to exclude BRISA from § 522(b)(2)(A), see note 45 infra, none of these courts found that 
the list was meant to be exclusive. Indeed, the appellate court in Graham stated that "the above 
list was not meant to be exclusive." Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984). 
45. Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is highly improbable that Con-
gress intended [the inclusion of BRISA-qualified plans] without mention in the Section 
522(b )(2)(A) exemption in the midst of a listing of significantly less comprehensive and less well 
known statutes."); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 311-12 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
1982) ("Even though BRISA was in effect at the time the Bankruptcy Code was debated and 
passed, BRISA is notably absent from the listing of other federal exemptions."), ajfd., 126 F.2d 
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extensive reach of ERISA, and the fact that Congress did refer to BR-
ISA explicitly when it wanted to do so elsewhere in the Bankruptcy 
Code.46 The Court concluded: 
Certainly, therefore, Congress did not "overlook" BRISA. Given 
the extensive and general reach of BRISA-qualified plans, it is highly 
improbable that Congress intended their inclusion without mention in 
the Section 522(b)(2)(A) exemption in the midst of a listing of signifi-
cantly less comprehensive and less well known statutes.47 
A careful examination of the list suggests Congress may well have 
"overlooked" ERISA. First, in two instances the subject area listed in 
the legislative histories does not correspond to the actual subject mat-
ter of the cited statute, suggesting that the list was not painstakingly 
drafted.48 Second, in two instances the legislative histories list statutes 
that were repealed prior to 1977, the date when the first congressional 
report was issued.49 The Civil Service Retirement Benefit statute was 
repealed in 1966 and the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability 
statute was repealed in 1974.50 Both of these statutes were replaced by 
similar statutes, but the legislative history does not provide cites to 
those statutes.51 If the list was so outdated that it included statutes 
repealed in 1966 and 1974, the absence ofERISA, which was not even 
enacted until 1974, probably indicates nothing more than that Con-
gress overlooked it. 
Additionally, if Congress had not overlooked ERISA but had in-
tended to exclude it, Congress could easily have expressed such an 
intent in the statute's text or legislative history. Congress' silence, 
coupled with its cursory compilation of the list, probably indicates 
that it did not explicitly consider the issue at all. 52 
Furthermore, courts often assert that it may be treacherous to em-
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[W)e find the failure of Congress to include ERISA plan benefits 
probative of Congressional intent that ERISA was not a 'Federal law' upon which a 
§ 522(b)(2)(A) exemption could be based."). 
46. See Golf v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983). 
47. 706 F.2d at 585. 
48. The legislative history lists "[s]pecial pensions paid to winners of the Congressional 
Medal of Honor" as located in 38 U.S.C. § 3101, but 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976) deals generally 
with veterans' benefits, including, but certainly not limited to, winners of the Congressional 
Medal of Honor. See 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976) (current version same); S. REP. No. 989 at 75, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 561, supra note 4; H.R. REP. No. 595 at 
360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6316, supra note 4. 
It also lists "Veteran benefits" as located in 45 U.S.C. § 352(e), but 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) deals 
with railroad unemployment insurance. See 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1976) (current version same); S. 
REP. No. 989 at 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 561, supra note 4; H.R. 
REP. No. 595 at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6316, supra note 4. 
49. Golf v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983). 
50. See note 62 infra. 
51. See note 23 supra; note 62 infra. 
52. This seems especially likely in light of the fact that this issue arises only under very 
narrowly defined circumstances: when the ERISA funds are not excluded from the estate under 
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phasize unduly congressional silence in interpreting statutes. 53 Thus 
great weight should not be attached to Congress' failure to include 
BRISA in the illustrative list. Yet this is precisely what the Goff and 
Graham courts did. 54 The Goff court realized this problem and at-
tempted to distinguish the instant case from the general rule by stating 
that this "often-stated admonition . . . does not apply in this case in 
light of the comprehensive consideration of this issue which is revealed 
by this history."55 It is unclear exactly what issue the court considers 
to have been comprehensively considered. Clearly the relevant issue, 
whether or not Congress intended BRISA to be an exempting statute, 
was not explicitly considered in the history at all. 
If in fact Congress did not consider whether or not BRISA was to 
be an exempting statute, that does not mean that section 522(b)(2)(A) 
cannot extend to include BRISA. Statutes are not limited to the spe-
cific examples in the minds of legislators at the time of passage.56 
When it appears that Congress did not actually consider the example 
before the court, the court must determine how Congress would have 
voted had the question been raised legislatively.57 As the remainder of 
Part II and Part III of this Note indicate, Congress would likely have 
included BRISA within section 522(b )(2)(A) had it considered the 
question. 
B. Comparison of ER/SA Provisions with Listed Statutes: 
Restrictions on Involuntary Assignments 
The bankruptcy court in Graham, after noting the absence of ER-
§ 541(c)(2) and the debtor has elected the state exemptions or has been precluded by state legisla-
tion from electing the federal exemptions. 
The opt-out clause that allows states to prevent debtors from electing federal exemptions, 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982), was itself the result of an eleventh-hour compromise in Congress and 
received little consideration. See Haines, supra note 19, at 4-5. The federal exemptions were 
designed under the assumption that they would be either an exclusive uniform scheme or at least 
an available alternative to state exemption schemes. Id. at 6. In spite of congressional expecta-
tions, 34 state legislatures have opted out, thus making the federal exemptions unavailable to 
bankrupt debtors in those states. See note 19 supra. 
53. See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946), quoted in Boys Markets, Inc. 
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) ("It is at best treacherous to find 
congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule oflaw."). A bankruptcy judge has 
criticized the reasoning of the Goff and Graham courts: 
I believe that the construction of the Goff court is rather strained, but after two courts of 
appeal have adopted that line of analysis, it is imprudent to rule upon another theory •••• 
The appellate courts have relied heavily upon Congress' failure to specify ERISA plans 
as falling within property exempt under federal law. Too much reliance has been placed 
upon that congressional silence. 
In re LaFata, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 70,020, at 85,773 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
54. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. 
55. Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983). 
56. See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979). 
57. McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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ISA from the listed provisions, proceeded to argue that the language 
of the BRISA provisions is narrower than that of the listed statutes 
because it does not protect funds from involuntary assignment. The 
court concluded that this indicates that Congress did not intend to 
include BRISA as an exempting statute. 58 BRISA literally prohibits 
only "assignment and alienation."59 The court contrasted this lan-
guage with that in the statute exempting Civil Service Retirement 
benefits, in which Congress explicitly exempted the benefits from 
creditors: 
(a) The money mentioned by this subchapter is not assignable either 
in law or equity ... or subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnish-
ment, or other legal process, except as otherwise may be provided by 
Federal laws. 60 
The court incorrectly concluded that although the listed statutes 
exempt the benefits they cover from creditors' nonbankruptcy actions, 
the BRISA provisions do not. 61 In support, the court argued that had 
Congress intended BRISA funds to be protected from creditors, a 
more expansive provision, similar to the provisions in the listed stat-
utes, 62 could have been included in the legislation. 63 Congress' failure 
58. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Banlcr. 305, 312 (Banlcr. N.D. Iowa 1982), ajfd., 
726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
59. 29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(l) (1982). 
60. 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1982), quoted in Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Banlcr. 305, 312 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), ajfd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
61. 24 Bankr. at 312. 
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (1964) (replacing 5 U.S.C. § 729) (repealed 1966; current version 
at 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a) (1982), is substantively similar) ("None of the moneys mentioned in this 
chapter shall be assignable, either in law or equity, or be subject to execution, levy, attachment, 
garnishment, or other legal process.") (civil service retirement benefits); 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976) 
(repealed 1980; current version at 22 U.S.C. § 4060(c) (1982), is substantively similar) ("None of 
the moneys mentioned in this subchapter shall be assignable either in law or equity, or be subject 
to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process .... ") (foreign service re-
tirement and disability payments); 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1976) (current version same) ("No assign-
ment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or payable under this chapter, 
except as provided by this chapter, shall be valid, and such compensation and benefits shall be 
exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy 
for recovery or collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived.") (longshoremen's and 
harbor workers' death and disability payments); 38 U.S.C. § 310l(a) (1976) (current version 
same) ("Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Veterans' 
Administration shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, ... 
shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure 
by or under any legal or equitable process whatever .... ") (veterans' benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 407 
(1976) (current version same) ("The right of any person to any future payment under this sub-
chapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid 
or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, 
garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.") 
(social security payments); 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1976) (current version same) ("The right of any 
person to any benefit . • . shall not be transferable or assignable at law or in equity except to the 
United States, and none of the moneys paid or payable . • . , or rights existing under said sub-
chapter, shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process or to 
the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.") (war-risk hazard compensation for injury 
or death or detention of employees of contracts with the United States); 43 U.S.C. § 175 (1976) 
(current version same) ("No lands •.. shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any 
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to include a more expansive provision in the statute led the court to 
conclude "that an BRISA fund is not within the exemption from the 
bankruptcy estate provided by other federal law under 
§ 522(b)(2)(A)."64 
The court in Barr v. Hinshaw also compared the BRISA statutes 
with the listed statutes, but reached the opposite conclusion. 65 This 
court found that "the similarity between the provisions of those stat-
utes that are recognized as constituting a federal exemption and the 
provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1056 and 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (and the 
accompanying Treasury Regulation) supports a conclusion that a fed-
eral exemption for BRISA plans was intended."66 The courts reached 
opposite conclusions because the court in Hinshaw understood that 
the prohibition on assignment and alienation in the BRISA provi-
sions67 had the same meaning as the language in the other statutes, 68 
whereas the bankruptcy court in Graham did not. 69 In other words, 
the court in Hinshaw recognized that the BRISA provisions prohibit 
involuntary as well as voluntary assignments, but the bankruptcy 
debt contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor.") (federal homestead lands); 45 U.S.C. 
§ 228(1) (1970) (repealed 1974; current version at 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1982), is almost identical) 
("no annuity or pension payment shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, 
attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment 
thereof be anticipated") (Railroad Retirement Act); 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1976) (current version 
same) ("no benefits shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or 
other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever") (railroad unemployment insurance); 
46 U.S.C. § 601 (1976) (current version same) ("No wages .•. shall be subject to attachment or 
arrestment from any court, and every payment • . . shall be valid in law, notwithstanding any 
previous sale or assignment of wages or of any attachment, encumbrance, or arrestment 
thereon.") (fishermen's and merchant seamen's wages). 
63. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Ban1cr. N.D. Iowa 1982), ajfd., 
726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
64. 24 Bankr. at 312. 
65. Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233, 235 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). The court 
used two of the listed statutes as examples, the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and the Social Secur-
ity Act. 23 Bankr. at 235. The Foreign Service Act provides: 
None of the moneys mentioned in this subchapter shall be assignable either in law or 
equity, or be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal 
process .... 
22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976) (repealed 1980; current version at 22 U.S.C. § 4060(c) (1982)), cited in 
Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. at 235. The Social Security Act provides: 
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be trans-
ferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights 
existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment 
or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law. 
42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), cited in Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. at 235. Note the similarity between the 
provisions used as examples by the Hinshaw court and the one used by the Graham court. See 
text at note 60 supra. 
66. 23 Bankr. at 235. 
67. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text. 
68. See note 62 supra. 
69. Compare Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
1982), ajfd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984), with Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 
233, 235-36 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
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court in Graham thought that the BRISA provisions prohibit only vol-
untary assignments.70 Thus, the bankruptcy court's argument in Gra-
ham will be refuted if it can be shown that the BRISA provisions 
prohibit involuntary as well as voluntary assignments; i.e., that they 
protect the funds from creditors' actions. 
In the context of nonbankruptcy creditor actions, a majority of 
courts have interpreted the language of the BRISA provisions to pro-
hibit involuntary, as well as voluntary, assignment and alienation even 
though a literal reading of the statutes would not preclude an involun-
tary diversion of pension benefits.71 In reaching this conclusion, a 
number of courts have examined the legislative history of BRISA, 72 
which provides that 
a plan must provide that benefits under the plan may not be assigned or 
alienated. However, the plan may provide that after a benefit is in pay 
status, there may be a voluntary revocable assignment (not to exceed 10 
percent of any benefit payment) by an employee which is not for pur-
poses of defraying the administrative costs of the plan. For purposes of 
this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to be considered a voluntary 
70. Compare Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
1982), ajfd., 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984), with Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 
233, 235-36 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
71. See, e.g., Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984); Tenneco Inc. v. First 
Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688, 689-90 (4th Cir. 1983); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 
460-61 (6th Cir. 1980); Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 517-18 (N.D. Tex. 
1981); General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466, 468 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Christ 
Hosp. v. Greenwald, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1025-26, 403 N.E.2d 700, 702-03 (1980). But see 
Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), ajfd., 726 F.2d 
1268 (8th Cir. 1984); National Bank ofN. Am. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers Local :f/:3, 
69 A.D.2d 679, 686-88, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131-32, appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 
1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979). However, if the debt is support due the employee's spouse or 
children, her interest in the plan is subject to garnishment. See Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 
698 F.2d 688, 689-90 (4th Cir. 1983); Operating Engineers' Local #428 Pension Trust Fund v. 
Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981); AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Ball v. 
Revised Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of Johns-Manville Corp. & Subsidiaries, 522 F. 
Supp. 718 (D. Colo. 1981); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 
Cody v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), ajfd., 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Stone v. 
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 925-31 (N.D. Cal. 1978), ajfd., 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert 
denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); Western Blee. Co. v. Traphagen, 166 N.J. Super. 418, 425-30, 400 
A.2d 66, 69-71 (1979); Ward v. Ward, 164 N.J. Super. 354, 361-63, 396 A.2d 365, 369-70 (1978); 
Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (1978); Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406, 
402 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 
702 (Fam. Ct. 1978); Commonwealth ex rel Magrini v. Magrini, 263 Pa. Super. 366, 398 A.2d 
179 (1979). But see M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Fam. Ct. 1978). 
72. See General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mort-
gage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 517-18 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Cody v. Riecker, 
454 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), ajfd., 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); General Motors Corp. 
v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466, 468 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Christ Hosp. v. Greenwald, 82 Ill. App. 
3d 1024, 1025-26, 403 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1980); Ward v. Ward, 164 N.J. Super. 354, 359, 396 
A.2d 365, 368 (1978); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 52-53, 394 A.2d 153, 155 (Super. Ct. 
1978). 
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assignment. 13 
The emphasized language can be read as stating that the exception 
permitting voluntary assignments of up to ten percent of each payment 
does not apply to a garnishment or levy. 74 When the statute is read 
this way, one can infer that the general prohibition against assignment 
and alienation must apply to both voluntary and involuntary assign-
ments: otherwise, it would be unnecessary to state explicitly that the 
ten percent exception does not apply to involuntary assignments, be-
cause there would be no general prohibition against involuntary as-
signments to which an exception could be made. 75 When the 
legislative history is read as a whole it is clear that this is the correct 
interpretation of this section, because this history reveals that the 
provision for voluntary assignment of the benefits is nothing more 
than an exception to the general prohibition against assignment and 
alienation. 76 
The policies underlying ERISA also support the conclusion that 
ERISA benefits may not be involuntarily assigned. Congress prohib-
ited assignment and alienation "to protect the rights of employees and 
their beneficiaries" and to "ensure that the employee's accrued benefits 
are actually available for retirement purposes."77 If involuntary as-
signment of benefits were allowed, the statutory structure that Con-
gress designed to protect ERISA benefits would be destroyed. 78 
Congress certainly could not have intended such a result. The district 
court in Cody v. Riecker reasoned that "judgment enforcing remedies 
such as garnishment, levy, attachment and the like can work the same 
73. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 5038, 5061 (emphasis added). 
74. Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 517 (N.D. Tex. 
1981); see Comment, Attachment of Pension Benefits Under ER/SA, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 255, 264 
(1979). One can argue that the emphasized language only refers to the general rule stated in the 
first sentence, and thus conclude that involuntary assignments and alienations, which include 
garnishments and levies, are not prohibited by ERISA. See 526 F. Supp. at 517; National Bank 
of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local #3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 596-97, 400 
N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87 (Sup. Ct. 1977), ajfd., 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127, appeal dismissed, 
48 N.Y.2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979); Comment, supra, at 263. This inter-
pretation, however, seems to be less plausible than the one stated in the text. Because the first 
sentence does not contain the phrase "voluntary assignment," but the second sentence does, it 
would be a strained interpretation to apply the emphasized language, which refers specifically to 
and indeed partially defines "voluntary assignment," to the first sentence only. 
75. See Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 517-18 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981); Comment, supra note 74, at 264; see also General Motors Corp. v. Buba, 623 F.2d 
455, 460 (6th Cir. 1980) (court recognized plausibility of the argument but did not decide 
whether or not to accept it). 
76. Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 518 (N.D. Tex. 
1981). 
77. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 4670, 4695, 4734; see also Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 
510, 518 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
78. Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 518 (N.D. Tex. 
1981). 
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result as an intentional assignment of [sic] alienation. They can dilute 
the benefits established by the trust."79 The Hinshaw court correctly 
recognized that the same reasoning applies in the bankruptcy 
context.80 
Finally, the Treasury Regulation81 interpreting the BRISA tax 
qualification statute supports the argument that the language of the 
BRISA statutes should be interpreted as expansively as that of the 
listed statutes. 82 This regulation applies to the general BRISA provi-
sion as well as to the tax qualification provision. 83 Although the tax 
79. 454 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), ajfd., 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (dictum in case 
involving obligation to support spouse, for which ERISA funds may be garnished); see also Com-
ment, supra note 74, at 264: 
If a ten percent voluntary assignment is to be permitted under the provision because the 
ninety percent remainder is considered to be adequate assurance of the availability of the 
benefit for the participant's use, there is no reason why a similar analysis should not be 
considered appropriate in the case of involuntary assignments. Therefore, the terms of the 
provision should be construed in a manner which effectuates its purpose - to prohibit the 
involuntary assignment of ninety percent of the employee's benefit at a minimum. 
80. Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233, 236 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
81. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13 (1984). 
82. See Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688, 689-70 (4th Cir. 1983) ("By virtue of 
the statute and the regulation, an employee's accrued benefits under such a qualified plan may 
not be reached by judicial process in aid of a third-party creditor."); General Motors Corp. v. 
Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Giving the required effect to Reg. § 1.401(a)-13, we 
conclude that pension plan benefits are not subject to garnishment ••.. "); Vink v. SHV N. 
Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Taken together, these provisions 
[§ 1056(d) and the Treasury Regulation] prohibit both the voluntary and involuntary assignment 
of vested pensions."); Co=ercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 520 
(N.D. Tex. 1981) ("In light of the clear delegation to the Treasury Department of rulemaking 
power respecting participation standards, Congress' cl= directive that Treasury regulations 
shall govern the employee benefit provisions of ERISA, and the pivotal role which Congress 
envisioned for Treasury in the statute's enforcement, Reg. § l.401(a)-13 must provide significant 
support for the determination that pension plan benefits are not subject to co=ercial garnish-
ment.") (footnote omitted); Christ Hosp. v. Greenwald, 82 III. App. 3d 1024, 1026, 403 N.E.2d 
700, 702 (1980) (citing Reg. § l.401(a)-13 as authority for the proposition that ERISA-plan ben-
efits may not be garnished); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 53, 394 A.2d 153, 155 (1978) (Reg. 
§ l.40l(a)-13 supports the conclusion that ERISA prevents both voluntary and involuntary 
transfers of benefits). 
83. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13 (1984) interprets both 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) and 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1056(d). Co=ercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 519-20 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981) (footnote omitted), explains: 
Title I, [of ERISA] ... contains provisions for the protection of employee benefit rights 
which are codified in Title 29 of the United States Code. Title II contains amendments to 
the Internal Revenue code regarding taxation of pension plans, which are codified in Title 
26 of the Code .... The tax terms in Title II are closely analogous to, and almost identical 
to, the employee benefit provisions for pension plans set forth in Title I. Thus, Section 
1056(d) in Title 29 incorporates the same assignment-alienation prohibition reflected in Sec-
tion 40l(a)(13) in Internal Revenue Code contained in Title 26. 
The identity between Title I and Title II of ERISA is important because Congress specif-
ically delegated to the Treasury Department, rather than to the Labor Department, author-
ity to issue regulations concerning participation, vesting and funding standards. Congress 
further provided that the regulations issued by Treasury would apply as well to the analo-
gous employee benefit sections of Title I in these areas. . . . That the relevant sections of 
Title I and II were drawn in identical fashion, therefore, seems clearly designed to ensure 
uniform results in their interpretation. 
See also General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 461-63 (6th Cir. 1980); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1202(c) (1976). 
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qualification statute itself, like the BRISA statute, expressly prohibits 
only assignment and alienation, 84 the Treasury Regulation language is 
similar to that used in the statutes listed in the legislative history, 
prohibiting anticipation, alienation, assignment, attachment, garnish-
ment, levy, execution or other legal process. 85 Because this regulation 
is legislative rather than interpretative, 86 it is to be accorded great def-
erence. 87 "It can be set aside only if the Secretary exceeded his statu-
tory authority or if the regulation is 'arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' " 88 The Treas-
ury Regulation clearly passes this test. 89 
Almost uniformly, the courts have held that the BRISA provisions 
prohibit involuntary assignments of BRISA benefits.9° Consequently, 
the BRISA statutes, like the listed statutes, prohibit involuntary and 
voluntary alienation. Therefore they should be exempting statutes 
under section 522(b )(2)(A). 
The bankruptcy court in Graham ultimately failed to articulate a 
rational basis for distinguishing the BRISA statutes from the listed 
statutes. Even the Eighth and Fifth Circuits recognized that the bank-
ruptcy court's argument was unsupportable and did not rely on it.91 
Both circuits instead attempted to distinguish the BRISA statutes 
from the listed statutes based on the "nature of the property" that they 
protect.92 
84. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982); see text at note 26 supra. 
85. 26 C.F.R. § 1.40l(a)-13(b)(l) (1982); see text at note 28 supra. 
86. A legislative regulation is one issued pursuant to a clear delegation of rulemaking author-
ity. An interpretive regulation is merely the administrative agency's construction of a statute and 
is valid only to the extent that it correctly interprets the statute. 1 AM. JUR. 2o Administrative 
Law§ 95 (1962); see Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 520 
n.12 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
87. General Motors Corp. v. Buba, 623 F.2d 455, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mort-
gage Ins. v. Citizens Natl. Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 520 n.12 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
88. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A}, (C)); Gen· 
eral Motors Corp. v. Buba, 623 F.2d 455, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1980). 
89. General Motors Corp. v. B.uha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1980). 
90. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. 
91. The court in Goff stated that it did 
not see across-the-board differences in the explicitness of the restraints against alienation in 
the listed statutes and in BRISA ...• Further, whatever deficiencies might be attributed to 
BRISA's terse recitations, in 26 U.S.C. § 401(a}(l3) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l}, at least 
those of the BRISA's tax provisions have been cured by virtue of the Treasury Department's 
interpretative regulation. 
Goffv. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 585 & n.28 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted}. The appellate court 
in Graham neither relied on nor expressly criticized the bankruptcy court's argument. The 
court, however, did recognize that the BRISA provisions exempted BRISA funds from creditors' 
nonbankruptcy actions, thus implicitly rejecting the lower court's argument. Samore v. Graham, 
726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984). 
92. Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984}; Goffv. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 
585-86 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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C. Comparison of ERISA Provisions with Listed Statutes: Nature of 
the Property 
In addition to arguing that Congress' omission of BRISA from the 
illustrative list was probative of an intent that BRISA not be consid-
ered an exempting statute under section 522(b)(2)(A),93 the court in 
Goff also argued that BRISA should not be considered an exempting 
statute because the "property" covered by BRISA differed in nature 
from that covered by the enumerated statutes.94 The court noted that 
BRISA regulates private pension and welfare benefits, whereas the 
listed statutes protect public funded and/or created pension and wel-
fare systems,95 or exceptional, traditionally guarded industries.96 The 
court then asserted, without further argument or support, that the 
"narrow characteristics of the cited statutes, rather than the broad, 
common trait of private pension and welfare legislation, was intended 
as the operative thread by which other federal statutes - overlooked 
or yet to be enacted - might be included.''97 The Eighth Circuit in 
93. Goff, 706 F.2d at 585. 
94. Goff, 706 F.2d at 585-86. The Goff court also made an additional argument based on the 
supposed nature of ERISA's restraints on alienation: 
[W]e do find that the contingent nature ofERISA's restraints on alienation differs markedly 
from the absolute prohibitions contained in the listed statutes. BRISA merely provides that 
as a condition of obtaining qualified status - with its attendant tax and other benefits - a 
pension plan must preclude alienation or assignment of its benefits. It does not prohibit 
pension funds from permitting alienation or assignment; rather . . . it envisions that "dis-
qualified" plans may be formed which are still subject to ERISA's regulatory scheme . . . . 
706 F.2d at 585 (emphasis in original). The court contrasted BRISA with the listed statutes, 
finding that "the listed statutes which establish or guarantee certain benefits directly preclude all 
such benefits from alienation or assignment." 706 F.2d at 585 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
Whether or not there are parts of the BRISA statute that regulate pension plans that are not 
qualified BRISA plans is irrelevant to the issue in this Note, which is whether or not ERISA plan 
funds are exempt. Nowhere does this Note argue that all pension plans should be exempt. Thus, 
assuming arguendo that the court has drawn a valid distinction, it still has not drawn a useful 
one for our purposes. For a pension plan to be an BRISA qualified plan, it must prohibit aliena-
tion and assignment. This is made clear by both the tax-qualification statute, see notes 26-28 
supra and accompanying text, and the general pension provision, see note 25 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
It is interesting to note that although the Eighth Circuit in Graham extracted its two argu-
ments directly from Goff. it did not see fit to include this one. See Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984). 
95. These would include the following: 
foreign service retirement and disability payments, social security payments, injury or death 
compensation payments from war risk hazards, civil service retirement benefits, Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits, Railroad Re-
tirement Act annuities and pensions, veterans benefits, speeial pensions paid to winners of 
the Congressional Medal of Honor, and federal homestead lands on debts contracted before 
issuance of the patent. 
Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 586 n.31 (5th Cir. 1983); see note 23 supra. The list should be 
altered slightly due to the errors in the legislative histories. See note 48 supra. 
96. "These would include the wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, as well as the 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act disability benefits." Goff v. Taylor, 
706 F.2d 574, 586 n.32 (5th Cir. 1983); see note 23 supra. 
97. Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 586 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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Graham also partially relied on this argument to support its holding.98 
The distinction drawn by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits unjustifi-
ably narrows the scope of section 522(b )(2)(A). The obvious "opera-
tive thread" by which statutes may be included under this section is 
whether or not they exempt the property that they cover from both 
voluntary and involuntary alienation.99 The statute includes within its 
scope "any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than sub-
section (d) of this section."Ioo These courts, however, would read the 
statute as if it said "any public funded and/or created pension and 
welfare benefits that are exempt under Federal law." 
Courts are bound by the language of a statute and are not free to 
substitute legislative history for that language. IOI Only if the language 
of the statute is ambiguous may a court look to the legislative his-
tory. I02 Neither court asserted that the language of the statute was 
ambiguous;I03 certainly there is no dispute that BRISA benefits are 
property. I04 The only term that might be ambiguous is "exempt under 
Federal law," but it is difficult to comprehend how these courts, 
which admit that BRISA benefits are exempt from involuntary assign-
ment, find an ambiguity. However, even assuming arguendo that this 
98. Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984). 
99. Some insight into what the "operative thread" is can be gained by comparing the policies 
behind the listed statutes with the policy underlying ERISA. For example, the Social Security 
Act is intended to provide a minimum level of security against the economic uncertainties of old 
age. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (Cong. Serial Set vol. no. 9887); S. REP. 
No. 628, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (Cong. Serial Set vol. no. 9879). It seems rational to 
assume that Congress included the prohibition against assignment, at least in part, to assure that 
the benefits would actually be available to provide that security. Thus, one may assume that 
§ 522(b)(2)(A) was intended to guarantee that the Social Security Act's purpose would still be 
fulfilled even when creditors sought to attach the benefits in a bankruptcy, as opposed to a 
nonbankruptcy, action. Similarly, ERISA is intended to ensure that benefits actually are avail-
able for retirement purposes. See notes 119-24 infra and accompanying text. The prohibition 
against assignment was intended to ensure that benefits would be so available. Consequently, if 
one accepts that social security benefits are exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A) in order to fulfill Con-
gress' purpose of ensuring that benefits actually be available, then BRISA benefits should also be 
exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A) in order to ensure that Congress' purpose be fulfilled. 
The "operative thread" is that both statutes, by protecting the benefits from involuntary as 
well as voluntary assignment, ensure that the benefits they protect will actually be available. 
Section 522(b )(2)(A) then l'"~:; to ftirther this goal by protecting the benefits in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings also. In this way the fortuity of whether the creditor is attempting to reach the benefits 
in a bankruptcy or in a nonbankruptcy action does not affect the fulfillment of Congress' 
purpose. 
100. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982) (emphasis added). 
101. Aronsen v. Crown Zellerbach, 662 F.2d 584, 588 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1200 (1983); see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). 
102. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (when statute is clear and unequivo-
cal on its face, there is no need to resort to legislative history); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the 
Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 463 (1937); United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 
269, 277 (1929); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981). 
103. See Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
104. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
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term is ambiguous, the legislative history does not dictate the distinc-
tion drawn by the courts.1os 
Even if courts are justified in referring to the legislative history to 
interpret the statute, they should be careful not to read into that his-
tory a restriction that is not clearly intended. The legislative history 
purports only to list some of the statutes that are within the scope of 
section 522(b )(2)(A).106 If a court could identify other statutes that 
exempt private benefits from involuntary and voluntary assignment, 
and that were also excluded from the list, then there would at least 
be some basis for concluding that Congress intended for section 
522(b )(2)(A) to apply only to benefits of a public nature. However, no 
such other statutes have been identified by the courts, nor do any leap 
to mind. Thus BRISA may be the only benefit scheme of a private 
nature to be a candidate for section 522(b )(2)(A)'s exemption. If this 
is true, then it is tautological to emphasize the fact that all of the listed 
statutes are public in nature because this would merely be a conse-
quence of overlooking BRISA in the first place. 
As the above discussion indicates, neither the Eighth nor the Fifth 
Circuit was any more successful than was the bankruptcy court in 
Graham in articulating a persuasive basis for distinguishing the BR-
ISA statutes from those listed in the legislative history.107 Because 
there is no reason to conclude that the differences in the nature of the 
property protected by BRISA and by the listed statutes are relevant, 
and because both sets of statutes protect benefits from creditors in 
nonbankruptcy law, BRISA fits comfortably within section 
522(b )(2)(A). Furthermore, as Part III explains, the policies behind 
both BRISA and the Bankruptcy Code suggest that BRISA funds 
should be exempt in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Ill. POLICIES OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND BRISA 
The Bankruptcy Code has the dual purpose of converting the 
bankrupt's estate into cash for distribution among creditors and of 
providing the bankrupt with a fresh start.108 For bankruptcy to be a 
truly effective remedy for the consumer debtor, a fresh start must be 
provided 109 by giving the debtor adequate exemptions and other 
105. See notes 23, 37-44 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. 
107. It is also worth noting that in the context of determining whether or not ERISA benefits 
were subject to garnishment for support payments, the Second Circuit found several of the listed 
statutes to be analogous to ERISA. AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979). 
108. Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 920 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1983) (quoting Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913)). 
109. H.R REP. No. 595 at 4, 117-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 
5966, 6078-79, supra note 4. 
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rights.110 
Congress recognized the inadequacies of state law exemptions and 
sought to provide adequate exemptions through a scheme of optional 
federal exemptions. m The federal scheme exempts tax-qualified BR-
ISA funds to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the 
debtor and her dependents. 112 The inclusion of this exemption for 
BRISA funds in Congress' federal scheme demonstrates that Congress 
contemplated that BRISA funds may be necessary for a fresh start. 113 
Hence it is consistent with congressional intent to exempt BRISA 
funds even when the debtor did not elect, or could not elect the ex-
plicit federal exemptions.114 
It could be argued that there is greater danger in allowing an ex-
emption under the federal "nonbankruptcy" exemption of section 
522(b)(2)(A) than in allowing one under the section 522(d) bank-
ruptcy exemptions,m because section 522(d) limits the exemption to 
what is "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any 
dependent." 116 Section 522(b)(2)(A), in light of the two BRISA provi-
sions, would authorize exemption of all BRISA funds. Thus it is pos-
sible that if BRISA funds are exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A), a 
person might shelter substantial sums of money in an BRISA fund, go 
into debt, and then declare bankruptcy shortly before the BRISA 
funds become payable to her. Conceivably this might be so unfair to 
creditors that the balance between the two Bankruptcy Code policies, 
protecting both debtor and creditor, 117 should be struck in favor of the 
110. H.R. REP. No. 595 at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6078, 
supra note 4. 
111. H.R. REP. No. 595 at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6087, 
supra note 4. 
112. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982) provides that a debtor may exempt: 
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or 
contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reason· 
ably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless -
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider that 
employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose; 
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and 
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 40l(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 
409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 40l(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409). 
(emphasis added). 
113. See In re LaFata, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1170,020, at 85,773-74 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 7, 1984) (construing§ 522(b)(2)(A) so as not to exempt ERISA funds "frustrates the legis-
lative intent to provide debtors with a fresh start in many cases"). 
114. See In re LaFata, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1J 70,020, at 85,774 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 7, 1984) ("A debtor's right to reasonably necessary retirement benefits should not hinge on 
electing under§ 522(d) rather than under§ 522(b). To condition that right upon the exemption 
scheme elected subordinates ERISA to the Bankruptcy Code in a mindless and mechanical 
manner.") 
115. See text at notes 20-21 supra. 
116. 11 u.s.c. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982). 
117. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. 
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creditor in considering the treatment of BRISA funds under section 
522(b )(2)(A). 
There are, however, strong arguments that suggest that there is 
little, if any, additional burden on creditors if an exemption is allowed 
under section 522(b)(2)(A) rather than section 522(d). First, once it is 
clearly established that creditors in a bankruptcy action cannot reach 
BRISA funds, creditors will be on notice not to extend credit on the 
basis of those funds. Second, even without such a rule, it is unlikely 
that creditors extend credit on the basis of BRISA funds because these 
funds generally cannot be reached in a creditors' action, 118 and there is 
no reason for a creditor to presume that she will be seeking reimburse-
ment in a bankruptcy as opposed to a creditors' action. 
The policies behind BRISA also compel the conclusion that BR-
ISA benefits should be exempt in bankruptcy proceedings. The pri-
mary purpose of BRISA is to protect individual pension rights.119 
Congress intended to ensure that retirement benefits actually be avail-
able for retirement purposes.120 With but one judicially created excep-
tion, 121 the bill "requires the payment of benefits only to a participant 
in a pension plan or to a beneficiary designated by him or by the terms 
of the plan."122 The Supreme Court has recognized the actual receipt 
of retirement benefits as the purpose of BRISA.123 The purposes be-
hind BRISA would be thwarted if BRISA funds were not exempted in 
bankruptcy proceedings. If Congress intended to create a narrow ex-
ception to the policy of BRISA, "that exception should be clearly ex-
pressed, and not one left to be implied from Congress' silence."124 
118. See notes 71-90 supra and accompanying text. 
119. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d cOng., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 4639, 4639. 
120. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 4670, 4734 ("To further ensure that the employee's accured [sic] benefits are actually 
available for retirement purposes, the committee bill also contains a provision requiring the plan 
to provide that benefits may not be assigned or alienated."). 
121. By virtue of the statute and the regulation, an employee's accrued benefits under such 
a qualified plan may not be reached by judicial process in aid of a third-party creditor .... 
A judicial exception has been carved out of this seemingly absolute prohibition. If the 
debt is support due the employee's spouse or children, his interest in the plan is subject to 
garnishment. . . • The exception is premised upon the statute's broad purpose to provide 
protection for employees and their families . . . . 
Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688, 689-90 (4th Cir. 1983); see note 71 supra. 
122. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 925 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (footnote omitted), affd., 632 
F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). 
123. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) ("In Nachman, we ob-
served that Congress through ERlSA wanted to ensure that 'if a worker has been promised a 
defined pension benefit upon retirement - and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are re-
quired to obtain a vested benefit - ... he actually receives it.' ") (quoting Nachman Corp. v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980)). 
124. In re LaFata, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1! 70,020, at 85,773-74 (Bankr. E,D. Mich. Sept. 
7, 1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
The court in Hinshaw was correct in concluding that BRISA bene-
fits should be exempted under section 522(b )(2)(A). The omission of 
the BRISA provisions from the list of exempting statutes is neither 
conclusive nor probative of Congress' intent as the list only purports 
to be partial and illustrative. Although the BRISA provisions are lit-
erally narrower than the provisions in the listed statutes, a closer ex-
amination leads to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to treat 
these statutes dissimilarly. The Treasury Regulation interpreting the 
BRISA provisions uses language as broad as that used in the other 
statutes. In addition, the prohibitions in the BRISA statutes have 
been interpreted as having the same broad meaning as those in the 
other statutes, prohibiting involuntary as well as voluntary alienations. 
Furthermore, the difference in the nature of the types of property pro-
tected is not a relevant distinction. Finally, BRISA benefits should be 
exempted under section 522(b)(2)(A) in order to effectuate the Bank-
ruptcy Code's policy of providing the debtor with a fresh start and to 
protect the BRISA policy of ensuring that benefits actually be avail-
able for retirement. 
